We study …rms'adoption of ‡exible versus dedicated technologies in the context of a mixed versus a private duopoly with product di¤eren-tiation. The ‡exible technology allows a …rm to become multiproduct or multimarket without bearing additional costs. We …nd that a con…guration where both …rms adopt ‡exible technologies is more likely to arise in equilibrium in the private duopoly. A similar result occurs when both …rms use a dedicated technology in the case of either almost independent products or products that are close substitutes. Privatization of the public …rm is socially bene…cial only in limited circumstances.
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Introduction
In the recent past, many …rms all over the world have substituted their traditional production processes by more ‡exible systems. One of the advantages of a ‡exible manufacturing system (FMS) over a dedicated equipment (DE) is that the former allows a …rm to supply several products and consequently to participate in di¤erent markets (in other words, becoming a multiproduct or multimarket …rm 1 ) without having to incur additional production costs. 2 The following two examples serve as motivation for the analysis we present. First, consider the internet access, telephone and TV services.
Traditionally the provision of these services required the use of di¤erent technologies and separate production processes for each one of them. At present though, cable technology can be used by …rms in order to provide these three di¤erent services using the same production process, therefore enabling …rms to be present in all three markets and to exploit economies of scope. In that sense, cable technology can be considered an example of FMS. 3 Interestingly, the matter has raised public concern. In the UK reg- The second example draws from the health care sector. There is evidence of economies of scope (Ozcan et al., 1992) , which can be related to the use of FMS. There are several empirical studies stressing the fact that public (not for-pro…t) hospitals provide a wider range of services than private (for-pro…t) hospitals (Shortell and Morrison, 1986 , 1987 and Schlesinger et al., 1997 although public hospitals tend to provide more innovative services without competition and private hospitals are more likely to add these services when there is competition (Schlesinger, 1998) . This body of observations suggest that not only the public or private character of …rms but also the degree of competition among them seem to be key factors in ‡uencing the adoption of FMS (thus, the multiproduct/multimarket character of …rms).
The study of the adoption of FMS by private …rms was …rst introduced by Röller and Tombak (1990) and Kim, Röller and Tombak (1992) , in the context of oligopolistic competition. Their …ndings indicate that the adoption of ‡exible technologies requires a su¢ ciently low adoption cost, su¢ ciently high product di¤erentiation and large enough markets. 4 Consumers bene…t from the use of FMS, due to the increase in competition. 5 In addition, Röller and Tombak (1993) validate these results by an empirical study. 6 To the best of our knowledge, the issue of technology choice as exempli…ed by the adoption of FMS versus DE technologies has not been studied in the context of a mixed market where private (pro…t-maximising) …rms co-exist with public (not-for-pro…t) ones. Such mixed markets are quite prevalent in transition economies but not exclusively so; telecommunications, health services and the postal sector in many countries are organized as a mixed market.
The aim of this paper is to provide an initial analysis into the choice of production ‡exibility by concentrating on a simple duopolistic market consisting of either a public and a private …rm (mixed duopoly) or two private …rms. In particular, we characterize the market conditions that would lead the public and private …rms to adopt FMS as opposed to DE. A natural question to address in this context relates to the potential bene…ts of privatizing the public …rm. This is of practical and policy relevance in the light 4 Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis (1996) use a similar model to assess multiproduct activity in relation to competition policy. 5 See also Gupta (1998) for some corrections and reinterpretations of the results in Röller and Tombak (1990) . 6 Eaton and Schmitt (1994) , in the context of horizontal product di¤erentiation, point out that the adoption of FMS may correspond to pre-emptive strategies leading to higher levels of concentration.
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of recent liberalization trends in many countries across the world. Interestingly, we …nd that privatization is socially bene…cial only when both …rms in the mixed duopoly adopt FMS and products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated.
The plan of the paper is as follows: …rst, we introduce the model (section 2) and then characterize the di¤erent equilibria (section 3). Next we analyze the behavior of …rms in the mixed and private duopolies and consider social welfare and the question of privatization (section 4). Finally we summarize our main …ndings (section 5).
The Model
Our model keeps the main features from Röller and Tombak (1990) and Kim, Röller and Tombak (1992) but allows for decreasing returns to scale. 7 Consider a duopoly competing in output and facing the choice between adopting a ‡exible manufacturing system (FMS) and a dedicated equipment (DE). The use of FMS allows participation in two existing markets, A and B.
The use of the DE constraints …rms to be active only in one of the markets.
In the case of the mixed duopoly, one of the two …rms, denoted by the subscript 2, is public (non-for-pro…t) and acts as social-welfare maximizer. 8 The system of inverse demand functions is given by:
and
where P A and P B are the prices for products A and B respectively, Q A and Q B the total quantities in market A and market B respectively and a > 0 7 This assumption is widely spread in the literature on mixed oligopoly, and is useful in order to avoid the case of natural monopolies which, considering the scope of our paper, is uninteresting. 8 The assumption about social welfare maximization is in line with the majority of the literature on mixed oligopoly. An alternative, not pursued here, is provided by Matsumura (1998): partially privatized …rms are assumed to combine the maximization of social welfare with the maximization of pro…ts. The pro…t of each …rm is given by:
where i denotes the …rm (i = 1 or 2) and j denotes the state of the industry according to the technologies used by the two …rms. In particular, j = 1 if both …rms are using FMS; j = 2 if …rm 1 is using DE and …rm 2 is using FMS; j = 3 if …rm 1 is using FMS and …rm 2 is using DE; j = 4 if both …rms are using DE.
Q A i;j and Q B i;j are the quantities chosen by …rm i in state j for markets A and B respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that if only one …rm is using DE, this …rm competes only in market A while the other …rm participates in both markets. If both …rms use DE, they compete in di¤erent markets (without loss of generality, …rm 1 in market A and …rm 2 in market B). Thus, the use of FMS increases the degree of competition not only in the market where a …rm is operating but also across markets (due to product substitutability).
F k are the …xed costs of …rms, which are related to the use of the available manufacturing technologies; k = F M S or DE. The costs of using FMS are assumed higher than the costs of using a DE. 9 For simplicity, we normalize the costs of the dedicated technology to F DE = 1. The costs of the ‡exible technology are then F F M S = 1 + s, where s captures the extent of the cost di¤erential between the two manufacturing technologies. C i are the costs of production, which are assumed to be quadratic and separable in output
Total Surplus (T S) is the sum of consumers'surplus (CS) and producers' 9 Developments costs are higher for FMS than DE; see Jaikumar (1986).
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pro…ts. Linear demand functions yield
Thus, T S is given by
We consider two versions of a two-stage game: (i) a private duopoly and (ii) a mixed duopoly. In the …rst stage …rms choose which technology to adopt and in the second stage they set quantity (Cournot). Decisions in each stage are taken simultaneously. Given technology choices made in stage one, it is straightforward to solve the output stage. 10 We can then derive the relevant payo¤ functions ( i;j ) that …rms use in solving the …rst stage. In other words, we use subgame perfection as our equilibrium concept. In the appendix, 11 we give the second-stage solutions for pro…ts (and total surplus). We can then represent the technology choice stage using this simple matrix: 
Equilibria Characterization
In this section we establish the conditions under which each of the combination of strategies in technology choice is a Nash equilibrium. We proceed by 1 0 Second-order conditions are satis…ed in all cases. 1 1 Second-order conditions are satis…ed in all cases. 1 2 In the private duopoly, Table 1 
Let 1 denote the critical level in (the di¤erence in) …xed costs s; that makes the above expression a strict equality. If s is lower than this critical value 1 then both …rms will choose FMS as it improves their pro…ts. From the above expression this critical value is,
where f 1 ( ) = 1728 + 288 2172 2 324 3 + 867 4 + 88 5 108 6 > 0.
Note that the critical value is increasing in market size, @ 1 =@a > 0, while it is decreasing in product substitutability, @ 1 =@ < 0. The larger market for either product makes …rms wish to participate in ‡exible production in order to serve both markets. With a low degree of substitutability (small ) …rms'products are perceived as highly di¤erentiated by consumers so that a …rm that opts for a dedicated production process (DE) and thus serves only one market e¤ectively looses out. Hence a larger market size and greater 7 product di¤erentiation point towards the adoption of FMS by the …rms. 13 Mixed Duopoly. From Table 1 which implies a corresponding critical value for s denoted;
where f 2 ( ) = 75 + 40 12 2 > 0. The second condition is equivalent to
implying an associated critical value for s,
where f 3 ( ) = 275 170 249 2 + 88 3 + 72 4 16 5 > 0: It is easy to establish that @ 2 =@a > 0; @ 3 =@a > 0; @ 2 =@ < 0 and @ 3 =@ < 0. A larger market (higher a) supports a larger critical di¤erence in the …xed costs of the two di¤erent types of technology while increased product substitutability (higher ) has the opposite e¤ect. This result implies that under low levels of competition the private …rm is less likely to have a multiproduct pro…le than the public …rm ( 2 < 3 for < ). On the other hand, the opposite happens for high degrees of competition ( 2 > 3 for > ). 15 Having analyzed both the private and mixed duopoly cases we now proceed to a simple comparison of the two regimes. First, we consider the conditions for an (FMS, FMS) equilibrium to occur, i.e. we compare the three critical levels of …xed costs, 1 ; 2 and produced by the public …rm. 16 Second, consider the case of relatively low substitutability. Here, the public …rm produces more in each market to compensate for the low substitutability between products, therefore making it less pro…table for the private …rm to invest in technology adoption; in essence the public …rm crowds out the private …rm's investment. 
where f that is, the critical value in the mixed duopoly is the one corresponding to the public …rm. equilibrium is more prevalent in the mixed duopoly.
The (DE, FMS) and (FMS, DE) Equilibria
Private Duopoly. From Table 1 Next we consider the case of the (FMS, DE) equilibrium. So that (FMS, DE) is an equilibrium it is required that (i) 1;4 1;3 > 0 and (ii) 2;3 2;1 > 0, implying that 3 < s < 5 must hold.
Lemma 6 (FMS, DE) is a Nash equilibrium in the mixed duopoly if 3 < s < 5 : In particular, given market size, a;there exists a critical value 1 9 This result is in contrast with Kim, Röller and Tombak (1992) where asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies do not exist.
2 0 Here the two …rms are interested in being the one using FMS. Given that 1;2 1;1 > 0 and 1;3 1;4 > 0 must hold, and by de…nition 1;4 > 1;2 (8 6 = 0), then 1;3 > 1;2 . Given the symmetry of the game, the same applies to …rm 2. Therefore, in the case of asymmetric equilibria the …rm using FMS obtains higher pro…ts than the one using DE. Therefore, given the multiplicity of equilibria …rms might end up in the worst scenario possible unless some coordination mechanism is used. 
Is Privatization Bene…cial?
In this section, we examine social welfare across the two market arrangements. In doing so address the question of privatization of the public …rm.
Obviously, privatization is bene…cial only if it leads to an increase in social welfare (total surplus).
Note that under the same market and technology conditions, the technology choice equilibrium outcomes of the mixed and the private duopoly might di¤er, as shown in Propositions 1 to 3. Therefore, in order to make a valid comparison across types of duopoly, we need to identify the equilibrium outcomes of the two duopolies for given sets of market and technology conditions. We proceed as follows: We start by considering one of the four possible equilibria in the mixed duopoly, say (FMS, FMS). We know that this equilibrium requires a particular set of conditions related to the parameters of the model, s, a and (as established in Lemma 1). Then we identify which would be the corresponding equilibrium outcome in the private duopoly under the same set of market and technology conditions.
Having done this, we compare the equilibrium level of total surplus across the two regimes. We, then, repeat this procedure for the other three possible equilibria in the mixed duopoly (DE, FMS), (FMS, DE) and (DE, DE). We denote by subscripts M the mixed duopoly and by P the private duopoly, 
(FMS, FMS) Equilibrium in the mixed duopoly
Recall From Lemma 1 that (FMS, FMS) is an equilibrium in the mixed duopoly if s < minf 2 ; 3 g. The equivalent condition for the private duopoly is s < 1 while from Proposition 1 the critical value for the …xed technology costs s is lower in the mixed duopoly than in the private one, minf 2 ; 3 g < 1 . So (FMS, FMS) is an equilibrium in both the mixed and private duopolies if s < minf 2 ; 3 g. A straightforward comparison of the total surplus in the two market regimes reveals that welfare is higher in the private duopoly except when products are nearly independent, as the following Lemma demonstrates.
Lemma 7 T S P 1
T S M 1 for 0:0223 and T S P 1 < T S M 1 for < 0:0223:
(DE, DE) Equilibrium in the mixed duopoly
As shown in lemma 3, the relevant condition for a (DE, DE) equilibrium in the mixed duopoly is s > 6 while the equivalent condition in the private duopoly requires s > 4 . We then distinguish the following cases. Case A: Case B(ii). In this case the mixed duopoly equilibrium is (DE, DE) while the private duopoly yields (FMS, FMS). In the following lemma, we compare total surpluses T S M 4 and T S P 1 .
Lemma 10 For a > 0 and 2 (0:0536; 0:6736); when s > 6 , s < 4 and
To sum up the results of this section, under the market and technology conditions that lead to an equilibrium with both …rms choosing DE in the mixed duopoly, privatization will not be welfare enhancing. We start by analyzing the …rst of these cases. Lemma 12 For a > 0 and = 2 (0:3133; 0:8173); when 2 < s < 6 and
(DE, FMS) Equilibrium in the mixed duopoly
In both cases, privatization would not be bene…cial. Therefore, under the market and technology conditions that lead to an equilibrium in the mixed duopoly with the private …rm adopting DE and the public …rm FMS, privatization is welfare reducing.
(FMS, DE) Equilibrium in the mixed duopoly
Finally, we consider the case of the (FMS, DE) equilibrium in the mixed duopoly. Lemma 6 requires that 3 < s < 5 ; which is guaranteed as long as > = 0:3133. In Proposition 3 we have shown that asymmetric equilibria do not arise in both types of duopoly for a given set of technology and market conditions. Moreover, it can be easily checked that 4 > 5 and thus, (DE, DE) is never an equilibrium in the private duopoly for values of s such that 3 < s < 5 : On the contrary, the conditions for (FMS, FMS) to be an equilibrium in the private duopoly are compatible with 3 < s < 5 , since 1 > 5 . Hence, whenever the equilibrium in the mixed duopoly is (FMS, DE) the counterpart in the private duopoly is (FMS, FMS) . Therefore, the only comparison that is meaningful here is between T S P 1 and T S M 3 .
Lemma 13 For a > 0 and 2 [0; 1), when 3 < s < 5 and s < 1 ,
As a consequence, we can state that under the conditions that lead to an equilibrium in the mixed duopoly with the private …rm using FMS and the public …rm using DE, privatization would not lead to an increase in surplus.
The results we have obtained regarding welfare comparisons across the two market arrangements have some potential policy implications for the debate about the privatization of a public …rm. As we have argued and
shown, privatizing the public …rm, i.e. switching from a mixed duopoly to a private one, would only enhance social welfare when the outcome in the mixed duopoly is (FMS, FMS), i.e. both …rms are adopting ‡exibility in their production, provided that products are not (almost) independent. The private duopoly outcome would also be (FMS, FMS) but would result in higher levels of social welfare. In all other cases, privatization would result in a reduction in social welfare. The following Proposition summarizes.
Proposition 4: Privatization is bene…cial in that it increases social welfare when the equilibrium outcome in the mixed duopoly is (FMS, FMS) and > 0:0223. In the remaining cases privatization of the public …rm is detrimental as it would reduce social welfare.
The relative strength of the above proposition in terms of its policy implications is derived from the fact that it can be used even without knowing the exact values of a , and s. It seems quite plausible to assume that policy makers know accurately the strategic plans of public …rms, in this case the FMS investment plan in technology choice and the closeness between the markets/goods. If the public …rm does not have any intention of replacing DE with FMS, then privatizing it should not be considered.
However, a word of caution is needed here. The results we obtain are based on a simple duopoly model, with linear demand and quadratic costs. It would be interesting to examine the robustness of the model's predictions in a more general setting of an oligopoly with general demand and cost functions and also whether the results are sensitive to the mode of competition, i.e. quantity versus price. We leave this aside for future research.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have introduced a mixed duopoly in the context of a differentiated product, quantity-setting duopoly facing the decision of whether to adopt a ‡exible technology (and become a multiproduct or multimarket …rm) or a dedicated technology. We have also the equivalent private duopoly so as to compare the outcomes of the two di¤erent market arrangements and provide some tentative policy guidelines on the privatization of a public …rm.
Our main …ndings can be summarized as follows: An equilibrium with both …rms choosing ‡exible technologies is more likely to arise in the case of the private duopoly. Further, an equilibrium involving the two …rms using dedicated technologies is also more likely to arise in the private duopoly when products are very close substitutes or almost independent. Mixed (asymmetric) equilibria with one …rm being ‡exible and the other dedicated, are less likely to be obtained in the private duopoly. In the case of a mixed duopoly, the public …rm chooses a dedicated technology when products are very close substitutes, since it is not pro…table f to bear higher technology costs in order to produce almost the same good.
Privatization of the public …rm is warranted, i.e., bene…cial, when the market and technology conditions lead to an equilibrium outcome where both …rms use ‡exible technologies and goods are not (almost) independent.
The underlying conditions for this equilibrium to arise imply high potential pro…tability (low technology costs relative to the size of the market and/or the degree of substitutability between markets). In all remaining cases, privatizing the public …rm would result in a reduction of social welfare.
Thus, our results provide limited support for privatizing the public …rm.
However, this conclusion is quali…ed by the limitations of the model used. 
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Note that @ 2 =@ < 0; and @ 3 =@ < 0: Further, from (8) and (9), we obtain 2 j =0 = 0:06a 2 , 2 j !1 = 0:042a 2 , 3 j =0 = 0:0977a 2 , 3 j !1 = 0 and 3 j =0 > 2 j =0 while 2 j !1 > 3 j !1 = 0.
Therefore 2 and 3 must cross. Setting (8) and (9) equal we obtain = 0:2432 where 2 and 3 cross. The result then follows immediately.
QED
Proof of Proposition 1 Lemma 1 establishes that the relevant critical value for s in the mixed duopoly is minf 2 ; 3 g; in particular, for < the relevant critical value is given by 2 and for it is given by 3 , = 0:2432: Thus, we need to show that 2 < 1 for < and 3 < 1 for : Note that @ 1 =@ < 0; @ 2 =@ < 0, @ 3 =@ < 0:
Further, from (7) and (8), we obtain 1 j =0 = 0:0937a 2 and 2 j =0 = 0:06a 2 respectively. 1 = 2 at = 0:4593 > and 2 j =0 < 1 j =0 : Therefore, It can be checked that the di¤erence T S P 1 T S M 2 is decreasing in s. Then T S P 1 T S M 2 j s= 2 = a 2 f P 1 M 2 ( ) 100(5+2 ) 2 (4+3 ) 2 (1 2 ) 2 < 0 as f P 1 M 2 ( ) = 200 3320 26319 2 22056 3 +16020 4 +23264 5 +8538 6 +1456 7 +216 8 < 0
. Hence, given that s > 2 it follows that, in the relevant range for , T S P 1 < T S M 2 .QED Proof of Lemma 13 It can be checked that the di¤erence T S P 1 T S M 3 is decreasing in s. Then, T S P 1 T S M 3 j s= 3 = a 2 f P 1 M 3 ( ) (1+ )(5+2 ) 2 (4+3 ) 2 < 0 as f P 1 M 3 ( ) = 3 3 2 2 + 3 + 4 > 0: Hence, given that s > 3 it follows that T S P 1 < T S M 3 :QED
Proof of Proposition 4
Follows from lemmata 7-13. QED 
